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RESOURCE RECOVERY MODELS FOR REGIONAL PLANNING
AND POLICY EVALUATION
Edward B. Herman
The MITRE Corporation
Bedford, Massachusetts U.S.A.
ABSTRACT
MITRE has designed and developed several models for regional resource re-
covery planning. These models have been applied in several planning and
policy evaluation programs, and, from this work, insights have been gain-
ed into the economics of regionalization in resource recovery planning.
The models and application programs are described, and the insights are
discussed.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we shall describe models for regional resource recovery
planning, and their application programs. From this work, we have gained
many insights into the economics of regionalization; but given the early
stage of our work, and the crude state of our data, these insights are not
answers, but rather questions to be asked, and suggestions for further in-
vestigation.
BACKGROUND
In resource recovery, there is an economic push towards regional solutions
-- to take advantage of the substantial economies of scale in processing.
But regionalization in turn generates two problems:
• a complexity in system design (see Figure 1)
• a difficulty in achieving a consensus among the large
number of autonomous decision-makers in a large region.
The planning model is intended to help with both problems:
• by sorting out the many locational, process selection,
and transportation link selection issues, and identify-
ing a minimum-cost solution; and
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a by assisting the consensus by illuminating at least what
cost differences are associated with political issues,
and thereby assisting in their solution.
Figure 2 illustrates the basic tradeoff on centralization for a hypothet-
ical region. The processing cost per ton declines continually as we move
to the right in that figure, towards fewer, and larger, plants. This is
the effect of the economies of scale. On the other hand, the haulage cost
per ton, required to gather the waste into the processing centers, increases
as we move to the right, towards more centralized solutions. In determin-
ing the proper degree of centralization we seek to minimize the sum of
processing plus haul cost. Figure 2 illustrates the cost comparison for
the four, two, and one plant cases, with the two-plant case showing the
lowest total cost for processing and haul. Note that the solution must be
discrete — we cannot have one and one-half plants in our region.
Figure 3 illustrates some of the non-economic effects of regionalization.
The processing plus haul costs curve would indicate a preferred plant size,
and hence degree of centralization, at the lowest point of that curve.
Other elements, which are difficult to quantify, such as political diffi-
culty, implementation time, and possible vulnerability (to strike, unex-
pected breakdown, etc.') will tend to increase with larger region size.
The vulnerability might be ameliorated by a modular plant design, but the
other elements are intrinsic to the political process of consensus. In a
state in which a state-wide authority over solid waste tonnage has been
established, most of these political costs are absent, but in most states
these costs exist, and should be considered. Their presence should tend
toward the selection of smaller region sizes. The models and model appli-
cations we shall describe below ignore these latter costs, and hence tend
to generate larger region sizes than would be appropriate for most states.
THE MODELS
We shall describe two models:
• WRAP (Waste Resources Allocation Program)
t RAMP (Recovery and Market Planning).
WRAP was designed and developed by MITRE with EPA support. WRAP is fully
operational, fully documented, and available to the public through EPA.
RAMP is in an experimental stage. It is essentially hand-operated and un-
documented. We have been using it at MITRE, and expect to develop it for
public use in the near future. The application programs described below
have been run on RAMP.
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Figure 4 shows WRAP providing guidance to the decision-maker (the fellow
on the right) on site selection, process selection, and other matters.
Figure 5 shows an overview of WRAP. The model will generate a regional
plan which is the lowest cost plan which meets all requirements. In the
process, it will:
• select sites, from among those offered
• select a process for each site, from among those offered
• size each site, and
0 determine all links and flows from sources of waste gen-
eration to processing sites, and among processing sites.
The model uses a fixed-charge linear programming algorithm as the optimizer,
which permits it to represent economies of scale (total cost curves which
increase at a decreasing rate of increase) through linear segmentation, as
in Figure 6. Ordinary linear programming encompasses cost functions de-
fined as slopes only. With the use of the fixed charge algorithm (the
fixed charges are the vertical intercepts of the cost functions) it becomes
possible to represent the typical economy of scale cost function to any
level of accuracy desired.
Figure 7 illustrates the levels of processing and allowed linkages in WRAP.
Note that there are two levels of transfer station and two levels of sec-
ondary processing permitted. The former permits the model to select truck
transfer linked to rail transfer. The latter permits more flexible struc-
turing of process alternatives. There can be only one level of primary
processing since, by definition, that implies an input of raw refuse and
an output of something else.
RAMP Capabilities
RAMP offers a capability to study the saturation of markets and to optimize
in the face of it, as illustrated by Figure 8. Note that in WRAP, all
markets must be fixed price and unlimited in size. In RAMP, markets may
be declining in price, and limited in size.
MODEL APPLICATIONS
The Planning Application
A model application for regional resource recovery planning should do two
things: (1) it should help sort out the many variables and identify a
minimum cost solution, and (2) it should help illuminate issues through
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answering what-if questions. Figure 9 illustrates a number of what-if
questions that have been answered in earlier applications of the model.
In illuminating issues, an application consisting of several "case";" is
defined, and the model is run once for each case. Each case defines a
particular situation of interest. It is important to note the fact that
the model defines the minimum cost structure and the system cost for each
case, so that in comparing the costs of two or more cases, we know that we
are dealing with a meaningful cost difference -- none of the difference
can be ascribed to a "poor" solution for one of the cases.
The model run for each case finds a solution which will handle all wastes,
meet all environmental standards and meet the defined state of political
acceptability represented by the case. Thus the incremental cost of mov-
ing from case to case represents the cost of easing a political constraint.
Figure 10 illustrates a hypothetical application. The economically pre-
ferred solution is shown on the left, representing the minimum cost way of
handling the wastes and meeting environmental and other real constraints,
such as tonnage and traffic limits. Each step to the right represents
easing a political constraint, by abandoning a controversial site, or aban-
doning a controversial process, or opting for a politically easier regional
structure, etc. The model defines the incremental cost of each such step,
and in so doing, clarifies the importance of the political issue for all
sides of the argument. It is hoped that this clarification of the incre-
mental cost involved in an issue would help resolve it.
The Eastern Massachusetts Planning Application
Figure 11 illustrates the system costs per ton in a recent Eastern Massa-
chusetts application of RAMP.
Since fixed-charge linear programming is a difficult kind of model to handle,
it was not until run C that the base case, or economically preferred solu-
tion, was obtained. In run D, the ECOFUEL II process, with questionable
markets for its products, was dropped. In run D, the model selected an
incineration/steam/electric power option at one site, in lieu of the ECO-
FUEL II process at two sites which had been selected in run C. The system
cost increased as illustrated in Figure 11. In run E, the Haverhill site,
which has been subject to major planning as a primary processing site, and
which turned up in runs A through D with only a transfer station, was forced
into the solution for 2,880 tons per day of primary processing, representing
the 53 communities included in the plan. The model elected to use that site
for 11,000 tons per day of processing, using the Incineration/steam/electric
power process. (The ECOFUEL II process was again introduced into this and
succeeding runs, but with a limited market; it was not selected in runs E
or F.) Since the City of Haverhill had in fact approved only 3,000 tons
per day» an upper bound at that limit was entered into run F, and the model
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rerun. The model chose to allocate 3,000 tons per day to Haverhill (the
upper limit rather than the lower limit) and selected a site on Route 128
near the Waltham/Weston line for 8,000 tons per day. In run 6, we forced
379 tons per day, representing long-term contracts, into an existing ECO-
FUEL II site at East Bridgewater. The model selected to divert just that
amount of tonnage from the Waltham/Weston site, leaving roughly 7,600 tons
per day at that latter site. In run H, a 3,000 ton per day limit was
placed on all sites, and the model picked an additional site in Boston.
Note that the incremental cost of this constraint (essentially a political
constraint) was $1.80 per ton system-wide.
All runs included a lock-in of 712 tons per day at RESCO, Saugus, Massa-
chusetts, representing existing long-term contracts.
Figure 12 and Table I illustrate the run G solution.
Table II displays summary information for runs C through H.
USING THE MODEL FOR POLICY EVALUATION
The RAMP model was run, using the same Eastern Massachusetts region previ-
ously studied, plus a new three-state region called INOKY (Indiana, Ohio,
Kentucky), to evaluate policy issues for the U. S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, as part of an assessment on resource recovery, re-
cycling, and reuse of materials from municipal solid waste. The runs de-
scribed below will be documented in a supplement to the report on that
assessment.
The effects of two different kinds of subsidies were studied:
1. a subsidy equal to the value of ferrous scrap in the market
(assumed paid to the resource recovery processor) and
2. a capital grant of 75 percent of the capital costs of new
resource recovery facilities.
Summary of Eastern Massachusetts Runs
In Run 1, the base case, the Non-Recovery Alternative (i.e., landfill) was
offered at a cost ranging from $20 per ton (Boston) to $7 per ton. This
represented MITRE's best estimate for the costs of haul and landfill pro-
cessing. The result was 100% of tonnage in the resource recovery system.
In Run 2, the modified base case, the cost of the Non-Recovery Alternative
was lowered to a range of from $12 per ton (Boston) to $2 per ton. The re-
sult was 95.1% of tonnage in the resource recovery system.
This run was used as a basis for the comparison with runs 3-6.
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In run 3, the equivalent of the market value of ferrous scrap was assumed
to have been paid as a subsidy directly to the resource recovery processor.
The result was 96.1% of tonnage in the resource recovery system.
In Run 4, capital costs of new resource recovery systems were assumed to be
subsidized to the extent of seventy-five percent of system capital costs.
The result was 98.3% of tonnage in the resource recovery system.
In Run 5, a smaller region size was simulated by applying a 2,000 ton per
day limit at all sites. The result was 36.1% of tonnage in the resource
recovery system.
In Run 6, a smaller region size with a better shredded fuel market was sim-
ulated. The 2,000 TPD limit at all sites was repeated, but with the addi-
tion of an improved market for shredded fuel, and with the offering of a
shredded fuel process (ECOFUEL II) at more locations. The result was 52.5%
of tonnage in the resource recovery system.
Table III presents a statistical summary of the six policy evaluation runs
in Eastern Massachusetts.
Summary of INOKY Runs
The general structure of the series of seven INOKY runs is shown in Figure
13. In all runs the same alternatives were offered for processing technol-
ogies and locations, and for transportation linkages. Runs 1 to 3 differed
from 4 to 7 in the lower non-recovery alternative (NRA) costs for the latter.
Run 1 is the base case for all runs, from which the effects of a ferrous
scrap subsidy (run 2) and a capital subsidy (run 3) were studied. The sub-
sidies were defined as in the Eastern Massachusetts runs. The percentages
of INOKY tonnage in resource recovery were 92.0 in run 1, 97.4 in run 2, and
95.0 in run 3.
Since runs 1, 2, and 3 had all generated strong resource recovery solutions,
the NRA was made more attractive in run 4 (decreased by $2 per ton in all
zones) to evaluate how robust the resource recovery solution was. Run 4
generated a solution with 81.6 percent of all tonnage in resource recovery.
Run 5 introduced a 2,000 ton-per-day limit at all sites to simulate the in-
ability to form regions of the size generated in runs 1 through 4, for any
of a number of reasons ranging from the difficulty in achieving political
consensus in a large region to the non-availability of technical planning
support. Run 5, using the favorable landfill prices of run 4, generated a
69.3 percent resource recovery solution. Run 5 then was used as a base
case to evaluate again the effects of a ferrous scrap subsidy (run 6) and
a capital subsidy (run 7). In run 6, 84.2 percent of the tonnage went into
resource recovery, and in run 7 76.8 percent of the tonnage was so allocated.
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Table IV presents a statistical summary of the INOKY runs; Table V presents
the structures of solutions of those runs, and Figure 14 displays the struc-
ture of the base case (run 1).
Analysis of Policy Runs
In should be noted that the resource recovery system appears viable in both
the Eastern Massachusetts and INOKY regions without subsidy, if the econ-
omies of scale, which appear to be available from centralized processing,
are not barred by political considerations or by an insufficiency of plan-
ning capability.
Subsidy or resource recovery in both regions would be expensive, partly be-
cause so much of it would be "windfall" (that is, would lower the cost of
resource recovery which would take place anyways). Subsidy in both regions
would also ineffective for the reason that there is little room for improve-
ment.
CONCLUSION
We are convinced as a result of these runs that the selection of•the correct
region size is an important adjunct of regional resource recovery planning,
and can influence the viability of resource recovery considerably.
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Non-Recovery Alternative (NRA)
Zonal Transfer Station
Refuse Derived Fuel (RDF) Processing
Steam Processing
Zonal Number
•• State boundaries
— County boundaries
•"^ Zonal boundaries
— District boundaries
Structure of the Base Case (Run 1)
Figure 14
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